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Abstract This study measures the effectiveness of anti-burglary security devices, both
individually and in combination. Data for 2008–2012 from the Crime Survey of England and
Wales are analysed via the Security Impact Assessment Tool to estimate Security Protection
Factors (SPFs). SPFs indicate the level of security conferred relative to the absence of security
devices. It ﬁnds that, for individual devices, external lights and door double locks or deadlocks,
are most effective but, counter-intuitively, burglar alarms and dummy alarms confer less protec-
tion than no security. Combinations of devices generate positive interaction effects that increase
protection more than additively. In particular, combinations with door and window locks plus
external lights or security chains confer at least 20 times greater protection against burglary with
entry than no security. Although further research is needed, the ﬁndings are consistent with
improved security playing an important role in long-term declines in burglary rates.
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Introduction
The Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) estimates that 2.1 per cent of households
in England and Wales were burgled in 2012/2013 and experienced 694 000 burglaries
(Ofﬁce for National Statistics, 2013). The impact of burglary upon victims is signiﬁcant, and
includes considerable psychological costs in addition to the ﬁnancial costs of replacements
and repairs. In response, many households have adopted security measures of various types.
Victim Support and Crime Prevention Ofﬁcers routinely advise victims of crime to improve
aspects of their household security (Spackman, 2000). However, unlike household insulation
and other similar ‘green’ interventions there is, by and large, no government support for the
installation of security devices within households in the United Kingdom and so security is
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generally left to the discretion of the individual. Poorer households in society are evidently
less able to afford the installation of physical security measures. Where target hardening is
provided to householders as part of speciﬁc crime reduction campaigns, this is often
limited in scope because of funding availability, and may be provided to those who are
perceived to be more vulnerable (for example, the elderly) regardless of whether or not they
are shown to be at greater risk (Grove et al, 2012). Households in the rental sector also
require the cooperation of landlords to make changes to their residence, which may not
always be forthcoming. In the United Kingdom, ﬁre alarms are mandated in rental properties
(Gov.uk, 2013). There is no equivalent requirement for household security, although
a minimum security standard for new buildings is currently under consideration
(DCLG, 2014).
Household anti-burglary security comes in a variety of forms, and there is mixed evidence
about their effectiveness: it appears that some devices are more effective in thwarting
burglaries than others. Homes with no or low-level security have 7 times and 75 per cent,
respectively, more burglaries than homes with high-level security (Pease and Gill,
2011).1 Van Dijk (2008, p. 55) suggests that routine investment in security devices
can result in a higher proportion of ‘failed burglaries’. The use of preventive security
measures is increasing in most countries, with the highest levels in developed countries
(Van Kesteren et al, 2000). This correlates with a higher proportion of attempted,
rather than successful, burglaries in these countries (ibid.). In a natural experiment whereby
newly built homes were required to have burglary security in the Netherlands, the
burglary rate fell in areas with new housing but without displacement to areas with older
less-protected houses (Vollaard and van Ours, 2011). It was concluded that by 2010 the
national burglary rate in the Netherlands was 5 per cent lower than it would have been
otherwise.
Nee and Meenaghan (2006) interviewed 50 offenders, ﬁnding burglars preferred proper-
ties with relative wealth and physical cues that offered them cover, access and getaway
routes. They write that: ‘Interestingly, security cues were mentioned least frequently … In
any case, all participants felt security features were rarely enough to deter them, due to a lack
of vigilance in locking up on the part of homeowners’ (Nee and Meenaghan, 2006, p. 942).
This ﬁts with earlier offender interviews that suggested that, in isolation, common household
security measures may have a limited deterrent effect (Reppetto, 1974). However, Cromwell
and Olson (2009) found some practical burglary prevention measures, such as target
hardening and visibility improvements, to have a deterrent effect, while a study of four
police divisions in Kent concluded that ‘the security of victim households is no lower than
the average’ (Winchester and Jackson, 1982, p. 20).
A possible reason for the apparent mixed ﬁndings is that security devices are often
grouped together or analysis appears to be conducted simply on the basis of presence or
absence of, say, a burglar alarm with little or no regard for whether other devices
were in place. This makes it difﬁcult to precisely identify the protective role of individual
devices or the different possible combinations. The CSEW asks respondents whether their
household has any burglary devices, such as burglar alarm, door double or deadlocks,
window locks, CCTV and others. The list of devices has changed, but not dramatically,
over time, and recent data sets include information about nine devices (discussed
further later). Existing CSEW-based research found that households with more security
have lower burglary rates (Mayhew et al, 1993; Budd, 1999; Ofﬁce for National Statistics,
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2013). For most CSEW analysis, security is grouped into four categories (Murphy and
Eder, 2010):
● no security;
● less than basic – any device except the concurrence of the those in basic;
● basic – window locks and door double locks or deadbolts; and
● enhanced – basic plus at least one other device.
Households with less-than-basic security were found to experience 6 times more burglaries
than those with basic security, and 10 times more than those with enhanced (Flatley et al,
2010, p. 2). Households with no security were also found to be at greater risk than those with
basic or enhanced security (Tilley, 2009; Flatley et al, 2010). A further study found that
households with an income less than £5000 and in possession of enhanced security had
25 times lower odds of burglary with entry than same-income households with no security.
In contrast, basic security conferred effectively no protection for £20 000–£29 999 income
households in 1997 (Tilley et al, 2011). With the exception of this categorisation, past
research on the relative effectiveness of security devices does not, to our knowledge,
examine the effectiveness of each separate device or the various permutations of their
combination. For this reason it seems that the evidence on the effectiveness of anti-burglary
security devices is somewhat mixed.
It is in this context that the present study aims to shed further light on this important issue
and to separate the effects of devices used individually and in combination. In particular, it
aims to answer the following question: What are the preventive effects, if any, of individual
and combined burglary security devices against domestic burglary with entry and attempted
burglary in England and Wales?
The present study is broadly consistent with the criminological theory of environmental
criminology. A term coined by Jeffrey (1971), environmental criminology encompasses the
rational choice and routine activity perspectives. In the present context, security devices tend
to make the target – the household – less suitable for victimisation (target suitability being a
cornerstone of routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979). The way in which the target
becomes less suitable varies with type of security device, with each either increasing the
actual or perceived risk or effort involved. This is consistent with situational crime
prevention which is a key operational component of environmental criminology (see
Cornish and Clarke, 2003 for the deﬁnitive statement of the 25 techniques of situational
crime prevention). Each of the preventive mechanisms is intended to tip essentially ‘rational’
offenders away from the decision to commit crime.
The structure of this article is as follows. The next section details the data and
methodology used to identify the effectiveness of anti-burglary security devices. The
preventive effects of individual devices and selected conﬁgurations are then detailed and
the study concludes with a summary of the ﬁndings and a discussion of their policy
implications.
With respect to terminology, we recognise that some security devices require an action
on the part of the owner to be activated. For this reason, the term security availability
that denotes whether certain burglary devices are present in the home rather than security
use is used herein. This recognises the fact that whether devices are in use is a different
research question which is not within the scope of the present study but might, at
least in part, be addressed in future research that focuses on modus operandi. For brevity,
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‘burglary with entry’ is sometimes referred to as burglary, and attempted burglary as
attempt(s).
Data and Method
This study analyses the CSEW (formerly the British Crime Survey, BCS) data from 2008/
2009 to 2011/2012. The CSEW is a national (for England and Wales) victimisation survey,
currently run by the Ofﬁce for National Statistics. CSEW sweeps were undertaken on an
occasional basis between 1982 and 1992 and biennially between 1992 and 2000. Since 2001/
2002 it has used an annual rotating sample of roughly 40 000 respondents. The survey uses a
multistage stratiﬁed sample, which is representative of the adult (16 years or older)
population living in private accommodation in England and Wales. For a brief history and
details of the methodology, questionnaire modules and items, and topics covered in the
CSEW, see Hough and Maxﬁeld (2007) and the various CSEW Technical Reports (www
.ons.gov.uk/ons/taxonomy/index.html?nscl=Crime+in+England+and+Wales, accessed 25
September 2013). Response rates have been consistently high varying between 73 and 81
per cent (Jansson, 2007).
The CSEW provides a wealth of information on respondents’ crime and related
experiences and attitudes, and assembles factual information about the respondents, their
households and area of residence, including security measures. The Crime Prevention
Module C is administered to a randomly selected quarter of the survey sample. The Crime
Prevention Module for the 2008/2009–2011/2012 CSEW included questions about the
availability of any of nine burglary security devices in the respondent’s home:
● Burglar alarm
● CCTV
● Door double locks or deadlocks
● DummY alarm box
● External lights on a timer or sensor
● Indoor lights on a timer or sensor
● Security chains
● Window bars or Grilles and
● Windows locks
For economy of space the enlarged capital bold letters in the previous list will denote the
respective security device in the remainder of the article.2 Information about the availability
of the same list of security devices at the time of the incident is solicited (via the Victim form
Module) from respondents whose household was burgled. However, not all burglary victims
were asked about their home security. This is because respondents complete a maximum of
six Victim Forms – three using a long questionnaire and three using a shortened version. As
questions about home security availability are included only in the long Victim Forms, data
on home security at the time of the burglary are not available for the minority of respondents
who reported at least three unconnected crime incidents of higher seriousness than burglary
(according to standard offence classiﬁcation – see Hales et al, 2000) during the year
preceding the interview.3 This means that information about the anti-burglary security
adopted by the survey’s most victimised respondents is not available.
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The unit of analysis here is the household. For this reason when a victim reported repeated
burglary incidents via more than one long Victim Form, their home security availability at
the time of the ﬁrst burglary during the survey’s reference period has been retained for
analysis. In the 2008/2009–2011/2012 CSEW data, 2.66 per cent of burglaries with entry
and 1.65 per cent of attempted burglaries with available security information were repeats.
After an initial burglary the use of external lights and burglar alarms doubles while
acquiring window locks increases by 50 per cent among burglary victims in England and
Wales (Budd, 1999). Similarly in the United States an additional burglary for every 1000
people increases the demand for burglary alarms by 3 per cent (Philipson and Posner, 1996).
Victims’ response to a ﬁrst burglary and whether this alters subsequent burglary risk, while
acknowledged as of great interest, is outside the scope of the present study.
For the purposes of this analysis the Crime Prevention Module C sample represents the
exposed population of households or the homes ﬂeet in England and Wales. Burglary
victims, as identiﬁed by the CSEW long Victim Forms, reﬂect the targeted households of this
analysis. A minority of cases where a respondent experienced both an attempt and a burglary
with entry are, however, excluded.4 To increase the potential number of homes with any
possible security conﬁguration from the above list of devices the four sweeps, that is, 2008/
2009, 2009/2010, 2010/2011 and 2011/2012, of the CSEW data have been merged in a
single data set. Together these record crimes that occurred to respondents from April 2007 to
March 2012.
This work uses the Security Impact Assessment Tool (SIAT) methodology developed and
described by Farrell et al (2011) in their study of the effectiveness of car security devices.
Here the SIAT methodology compares the likelihood of burglary for populations without
security, with a particular security device or combination of devices to the overall likelihood
of burglary. This comparison results in odds ratios. Contrasting the odds ratios given the
availability of a security device or combination of devices with respect to no security
identiﬁes the amount of protection conferred relative to no security. The resulting metric is
termed the Security Protection Factor (SPF). The coincidence between this abbreviation and
that denoting Sunscreen Protection Factor is serendipitous because ‘in both cases the SPF
states the multiples of additional exposure time, relative to the absence of protection, beyond
which the average owner is burned’ (Farrell et al, 2011, p. 23). The underlying principle of
the SIAT is simple. If no protection is conferred, the distribution of security devices would
be the same between burgled households and all households in the population, the homes
ﬂeet. Speciﬁc aspects of the methodology will be clariﬁed as the results are described.
The nine security devices listed above would produce such a large set of possible
combinations that it would be effectively useless for practical purposes. Hence two strategies
were used to keep the study practical, in a similar fashion to Farrell et al (2011). First, we
removed window bars and dummy alarms from much of the analysis except to identify their
individual effects, because they are rare and for present purposes judged to be largely
undesirable. This is shown in Table 1, which demonstrates that window bars and dummy
alarms are rare relative to most other devices. Further, when they are each the only device
present in a household, they occur in only 0.06 and 0.09 per cent of households, respectively.
Their unpopularity is perhaps not surprising though. Window bars and grills in England and
Wales are generally aesthetically displeasing, with little resemblance to the art deco
ironwork one sometimes encounters elsewhere. They also present a potential ﬁre hazard
and insinuate a fortress-like society. We also found, in analysis not presented here, that the
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availability of window bars has dropped since the mid-1990s, likely reﬂecting a continuing
change in preferences for the reasons suggested. Dummy alarms on the other hand
are no more displeasing than functioning ones, but the protection they confer relies on the
false perception of the potential burglar who might mistake it as an operating burglar
alarm. Therefore dummy alarms by construction do not offer any improvement in ‘real’
security that may explain why they are not preferred by households, except perhaps where
households cannot afford a working alarm. For these reasons window bars and dummy
alarms are examined individually but are not included in the security combinations
(conﬁgurations) for which more extensive results are offered, on the grounds that this
exclusion is of negligible consequence. The 7 remaining security devices generate 128
possible conﬁgurations.5 Second, and consistent with Farrell et al (2011), we utilised a cut-
off point for sample availability of each security conﬁguration. Of the 128 combinations of
security devices, less than half (n= 52) were available in at least 50 households in the
sample. This is an arbitrary cut-off point and, as mentioned, dummy alarms and window bars
do not even reach this threshold. The use of indoor lights alone was also infrequent,
occurring only 47 times over the 4 years surveyed, and is excluded.
Results
The extent of the protection conferred by individual anti-burglary devices and selected
combinations is discussed in this section. Table 2 presents the information that enables
calculating the SPFs. The SPFs for individual devices are shown in Figure 1 and those for
combinations in Figures 2 and 3 and Table 3 later in this section. An indication of the
statistical signiﬁcance of the odds ratios is given in both Tables 2 and 3.6 Burglary security
devices in Table 2 and their conﬁgurations in both tables are listed in descending order of
sample size in the 2008/2009–2011/2012 CSEW to allow the extent of their use in England
and Wales better to be appreciated.
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 2 present the samples sizes for all households in the
sample (hereafter ‘all households’) and for victims of burglary with entry and of attempted
burglary. Recall that only security conﬁgurations with more than 50 households in the
sample are shown. The odds ratios that are given in the last two columns of Table 2 are
Table 1: Availability of security devices per sweep, 2008/2009–2011/2012 CSEW
Security device CSEW sweep
2008/2009 2009/2010 2010/2011 2011/2012
Burglar alarm 29.4 29.4 28.3 27.6
CCTV 4.6 4.6 4.9 5.3
Dummy alarm 4.6 4.1 5.2 4.6
Door double or deadlocks 78.9 80.3 77.7 76.9
External lights on Sensor/Timer 46.6 45.1 42.6 42.5
Indoor lights on Sensor/Timer 26.0 24.2 21.5 21.5
Security Chains 33.9 31.6 31.0 29.6
Window Bars or Grilles 1.8 2.5 2.4 2.2
Window Locks 85.2 87.0 82.0 83.0
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Table 2: Sample sizes and odds ratio of burglary with entry and attempted burglary across individual security
devices and their conﬁgurations (2008/2009–2011/2012 CSEW)
Security devicesa Number of respondents Odds ratio
All households Victims of Burglary Attempt
Burglary Attempt
No security 1835 821 286 7.46** 4.30**
WD 5381 192 111 0.59** 0.57**
EWD 3307 43 37 0.22** 0.31**
WSD 2743 38 56 0.23** 0.56**
EWBD 1953 53 40 0.45** 0.57**
W 1765 120 69 1.13 1.08
EWSD 1687 24 15 0.24** 0.25**
EIWBD 1589 24 23 0.25** 0.40**
EIWD 1537 14 11 0.15** 0.20**
WBD 1455 73 39 0.84 0.74
IWD 961 26 6 0.45** 0.17**
EIWSBD 931 3 13 0.05** 0.39**
D 905 145 105 2.67** 3.20**
EWSBD 870 12 15 0.23** 0.48**
EIWSD 824 13 4 0.26** 0.13**
WSBD 709 17 13 0.40** 0.51*
WS 678 24 26 0.59** 1.06
EW 675 17 17 0.42** 0.69
IWBD 530 13 8 0.41** 0.42*
IWSD 515 10 7 0.32** 0.38**
SD 463 27 23 0.97 1.37
S 321 70 38 3.63** 3.27**
IWSBD 314 6 9 0.32** 0.79
ED 313 13 18 0.69 1.59
WB 272 26 13 1.59* 1.32
EWS 253 8 9 0.53 0.98
E 242 36 19 2.48** 2.17**
EWB 229 10 14 0.73 1.69
B 212 106 52 8.33** 6.77**
EIW 177 6 2 0.56 0.31
ESD 171 5 3 0.49 0.48
CWD 161 3 2 0.31* 0.34
CEIWBD 152 2 4 0.22* 0.73
IW 149 8 3 0.89 0.56
CEWD 145 0 7 — 1.33
CEWBD 145 2 6 0.23* 1.14
BD 136 31 21 3.80** 4.26**
CWSD 116 1 1 0.14* 0.24
Don’t know 114 44 61 6.43** 14.76**
EIWB 103 4 7 0.65 1.88
WSB 93 3 6 0.54 1.78
EBD 90 6 6 1.11 1.84
ID 86 4 6 0.78 1.93
EWSB 85 3 4 0.59 1.30
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Table 2 continued
Security devicesa Number of respondents Odds ratio
All households Victims of Burglary Attempt
Burglary Attempt
CEWSBD 82 0 2 — 0.67
EID 82 4 2 0.81 0.67
ES 71 7 6 1.64 2.33*
EIWS 69 0 3 — 1.20
CW 65 2 1 0.51 0.42
CWBD 64 0 2 — 0.86
IWS 57 5 1 1.46 0.48
C 57 16 9 4.68** 4.36**
IWB 56 4 2 1.19 0.99
Other conﬁgurationsb 1171 101 93
Including: I 47 6 5 2.13 2.94*
Y 34 11 9 5.39** 7.30**
G 21 7 2 5.56** 2.63
Total 37 416 2245 1356
aThe conﬁgurations ‘CEWSD’, ‘CEIWD’, and of all 7 security devices, ‘B, D, S, W, I, E and C’, were reported by
81, 72 and 97 respondents, respectively but no burglary victims in the 2008/2009–2011/2012 CSEW merged data
set. Therefore they are omitted from Table 2.
b
‘Other conﬁgurations’ refers to all the remaining ones with each reported by less than 50 respondents. For this
reason they are not examined further here except for the individual devices that are included within this category.
*0.05>P⩾0.01; **P⩽0.01.
Notes: Abbreviations: B=Burglar alarm; C=CCTV; Y=Dummy Alarm; D=Door double or deadlocks;
E=External lights on a timer or sensor switch; I= Indoor lights on a timer or sensor switch; S= Security chains;
G=Window bars or grilles; W=Window locks.
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Figure 1: SPFs for individual devices by crime type (signiﬁcant at 5 per cent level unless shaded in white)
based on the 2008/2009–2011/2012 CSEW.
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calculated as follows: The bottom row shows that there were 37 416 households in the
sample, of which 2245 experienced burglary and 1356 experienced attempted burglary. The
ﬁrst row of the table shows that 1835 of all 37 416 households (4.9 per cent) reported no
security devices. However, 821 of 2245 burgled households (36.6 per cent) reported no
security, as did 286 of 1356 (21.1 per cent) of household that experienced attempted
burglary. The odds ratios compare the percentage with respect to the two crime types to that
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Figure 2: SPFs for pairs or triplets home security conﬁgurations by crime type (signiﬁcant at 5 per cent level
unless shaded in white) based on the 2008/2009–2011/2012 CSEW.
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Figure 3: SPFs for four or more home security conﬁgurations by crime type (signiﬁcant at 5 per cent level
unless shaded in white) based on the 2008/2009–2011/2012 CSEW.
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Table 3: SPFs and NIEs of burglary with entry and attempted burglary across security devices conﬁgurations
(2008/2009–2011/2012 CSEW)
Security devices Burglary with entry Attempted burglary
SPF NIE SPF NIE
WD 12.54** 3.17 7.56** 2.23
EWD 34.41** 22.03 13.93** 6.62
WSD 32.30** 20.87 7.63** 0.99
EWBD 16.49** 3.21 7.61** −0.34
EWSD 31.45** 17.02 17.53** 8.90
EIWBD 29.62** 12.84 10.77** 1.35
EIWD 49.12** 33.23 21.78** 13.00
WBD 8.92 −1.35 5.81 −0.15
IWD 16.54** 3.66 24.96** 18.17
EIWSBD 138.85** 120.01 11.16** 0.43
EWSBD 32.44** 17.11 9.04** −0.23
EIWSD 28.36** 10.42 32.11** 22.01
WSBD 18.66** 6.34 8.50* 1.22
WS 12.64** 4.01 4.06 −1.24
EW 17.76** 8.18 6.19 0.22
IWBD 18.24** 4.47 10.33* 2.89
IWSD 23.04** 8.11 11.47** 3.35
SD 7.67 2.83 3.14 0.48
IWSBD 23.41** 7.59 5.44 −3.31
ED 10.77 4.97 0.69 −0.62
WB 4.68* −2.79 3.26 −1.36
EWS 14.15 2.51 4.38 −2.91
EWB 10.25 −0.24 2.55 −4.06
EIW 13.20 0.11 13.79 6.36
ESD 15.30 7.45 8.88 4.24
CWD 24.01* 13.04 12.55 6.23
CEIWBD 34.00* 15.63 5.92 −4.48
IW 8.33 7.74 7.74 2.29
CEWD — — 3.23 −5.07
CEWBD 32.44* 17.57 3.77 −5.17
BD 1.96** −1.72 1.01** −0.97
CWSD 51.90* 38.88 18.08 10.45
EIWB 11.52 −2.47 2.29 −5.78
WSB 13.87 4.34 2.42 −3.52
EBD 6.71 0.02 2.34 −1.63
ID 9.62 3.32 2.23 −0.57
EWSB 12.68 0.14 3.31 −4.61
CEWSBD — — 6.39 −3.86
EID 9.17 −0.13 6.39 1.60
ES 4.54 −0.52 1.84* −1.46
EIWS — — 3.58 −5.17
CW 14.54 6.37 10.13 5.16
CWBD — — 4.99 −1.97
IWS 5.10 −7.04 8.88 2.12
IWB 6.26 −4.72 4.36 −1.72
*0.05>P⩾0.01; **P⩽0.01.
Abbreviations: B=Burglar alarm; C=CCTV; D=Door double or deadlocks; E=External lights on a timer or
sensor switch; I= Indoor lights on a timer or sensor switch; S=Security chains; W=Window locks.
Notes: Results are given in descending order of sample size that reported each conﬁguration; conﬁgurations not
reported by victims at the time of ﬁrst burglary cannot produce SPFs.
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for all households. Therefore for households with no security, the odds ratio is 7.46
(calculated as 36.6/4.9) and for attempts it is 4.30 (calculated as 21.1/4.9). The superscript
notation shows that these odds ratios are highly statistically signiﬁcant. In a similar way, the
odds ratios of different security conﬁgurations can be calculated. However, not all
conﬁgurations have signiﬁcant odds ratios. In total, 31 individual devices and conﬁgurations
show odds ratios that are statistically signiﬁcant for either type of burglary.
The (multiplicative) difference of odds ratios between any individual device or conﬁg-
uration and no security gives its SPF value. These are shown in the graphs of this section and
the second and fourth columns of Table 3 with an indication of their statistical signiﬁcance.
They are calculated as follows: In the second row of ﬁgures of Table 2, households with
window and door locks have an odds ratio with respect to burglary with entry of 0.59,
which is 12.54 (7.46/0.59) times lower than no security. This SPF implies that window and
door locks confer 12 times higher protection against burglary with entry than no security.
Another way of expressing this is that window and door locks reduce the odds ratio of
burglary with entry down to one-twelfth compared with no security. This is considerable
compared with previous evidence on car security SPFs that did not exceed 25 (Farrell et al,
2011). It appears, however, modest in relation to other burglary security conﬁgurations
as will be seen in the following paragraphs. The discussion here uses both interpretations
interchangeably.
The SPFs of the individual devices and conﬁgurations with at least one statistically
signiﬁcant odds ratios from Table 2, as mentioned, are shown across three graphs,
Figures 1–3. They are listed in descending order of the SPFs against burglary with entry
values that is in general more responsive to security than attempted burglary as found in
previous research (Van Kesteren et al, 2000). An SPF of 1 implies that the odds ratios of no
security and the examined device or conﬁguration are equal and therefore the latter confers
no protection. SPFs lower than 1 imply that the respective device or conﬁguration is counter-
productive: the odds of burglary are actually lower without any security than the device
examined. Therefore the following discussion and related graphs of SPFs use 1 (rather than 0)
as baseline (the value of the y-axis at which the x-axis intersects) which best reﬂects the
protection conferred by each burglary device conﬁguration.
Single devices
It remains relatively common to use a single type of security device, as shown by the sample
sizes in Table 2. As expected, the SPFs for individual devices tend to be lower than those for
combinations in Table 3. For visual clarity the SPFs of individual burglary security devices
across crime type are also given in Figure 1. When devices are used individually, window
locks have the highest SPF followed by indoor sensor lights, but neither has statistically
signiﬁcant odds ratios and for this reason their respective SPFs are shown in solid white bars.
This suggests we cannot conclude with conﬁdence that they confer greater than no security.
Given that the Home Ofﬁce classiﬁes window locks together with door locks as basic
security, the fact that on their own they do not confer statistically signiﬁcant protection
comes as a surprise. The reasons for this remain uncertain and further research might clarify
that issue. Perhaps window locks fall quickly into disuse if they are add-on rather than built-
in, as may be more likely in older households with less security generally. Perhaps integrated
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(built-in) window locks work automatically when a window is closed whereas add-on locks
typically require the ﬁtting of a nut onto a bolt, producing signiﬁcant variation in usage
between window locks (perhaps particular in summer months when windows are opened
more frequently). Future analysis on modus operandi in burglary incidents recorded by the
CSEW will shed some light on this. In addition, window locks are an essential built-in
feature of double-glazed windows and therefore their widespread availability (see Table 1)
has possibly more to do with heat insulation and less with burglary security. Indeed Table 2
shows that they are available to burgled households at the same rate as in the general
population. Similarly, indoor lights on sensor and window bars have statistically non-
signiﬁcant odds ratios for burglary with entry and attempted burglary (solid white bars in
Figure 1), respectively. This might be partially because of the low number of households
using indoor lights (47 or 0.13 per cent) or window bars (21 or 0.06 per cent) as the only
security feature of their homes (see Table 2).
It is evident from Figure 1 that individual devices are much more effective against
burglary with entry than attempts which is an anticipated and welcome result. Of the
statistically signiﬁcant results, external lights or door locks confer the highest protection
(SPFs of 3 and 2.8, respectively, for burglary with entry) among all individual devices, that
is, assuming the presence of no other. Previous research, some based on offender interviews,
has indeed identiﬁed high visibility by overlooking occupied properties or passers-by as a
main burglary deterrent (Coupe and Blake, 2006; Coupe and Hahn, 2010). Door locks
increase the effort and time needed for breaking into a property and thus the risk of the
potential burglar being interrupted by passers-by or neighbours (Chenery and Pease, 2013).
Security chains are roughly twice better than no security while CCTV, dummy alarm and
window bars confer some protection against burglary with entry but none for attempts.
Burglar alarms and dummy alarms appear to increase risk of attempted burglary. The
SPFs of dummy alarm for attempts and burglar alarm for any type of burglary are less than
1 implying a counter-productive effect: having just a burglar alarm and no other form of
security confers less protection than no security at all. This is counter-intuitive but not without
some plausible explanations. It is conceivable that a burglar alarm in a house with no other
security features may ﬂag the existence of valuables relative to other ‘unsecured’ properties. In
addition, as with the window locks discussed earlier it requires some action on the part of the
householder to become functional against burglary. Its simple availability unless set does
not by deﬁnition confer any active protection, but even worse it may give a false sense of
protection that makes such households ‘careless’. Another plausible explanation is that burglar
alarms were ﬁtted to homes that had been burgled before the CSEW reference period and
therefore the respective households are repeat burglary victims, although the data cannot
conﬁrm this. There is ample research evidence that victims have a higher risk of a subsequent
(repeat) burglary and that policies that prevent repeat burglary reduce the overall burglary rates
(Pease, 1998; Grove et al, 2012). Therefore the repeat victimisation risk may counterbalance
the potential protection conferred by the burglar alarm. It is also possible that respondents to
the CSEWmay misinterpret false alarms as attempted burglary. However, dummy alarms also
do not offer any active protection and so their protective effect against burglary with entry is
hard to explain. One possibility is that burglars believe a silent alarm, and perhaps a personnel
response, has been triggered if there is no audible alarm. These results suggest that a range of
issues exists for future research including the role of modus operandi of burglars and the
attributes of households and residential areas.
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Device pairs and triples
Generally speaking, protection increases with the number of devices, as evidenced by the
different maximum ordinal scale values of Figures 1–3. The SPFs of pairs and triplets of
security devices are given in Figure 2. As mentioned, the exact SPF values can be found in
Table 3 (second and fourth column). These results suggest that triples are more effective than
pairs. The exception is the pairing of external lights and window locks (EW) which, for
burglary, is more effective than the IWD triplet (indoor lights, window locks and door locks).
Examining, ﬁrst, pairs of security devices burglar alarm and door locks (BD) confer no
protection for attempted burglary but nearly half the risk of burglary with entry compared
with no security. By contrast, window and door locks (WD), the Home Ofﬁce basic security
conﬁguration, reduce the odds ratios of burglary with entry or attempts to roughly 1/13 and
1/8, respectively. This is a considerable effect which, compared with the SPFs of pairs of car
crime prevention devices calculated by Farrell et al (2011) , suggests that burglary is much
more responsive to target hardening than car crime. The remaining three pairs that
incorporate window locks, that is, together with external lights (EW), security chains (WS)
or burglar alarm (WB) confer statistically signiﬁcant protection only against burglary with
entry with respective SPFs at roughly 18, 13 and 5. Owing perhaps to the great effectiveness
of external lights, their combination with window locks confers the highest protection
against completed burglaries, among all pairs of devices with signiﬁcant odds ratios,
including WD, the Home Ofﬁce’s basic security. Finally external lights and security chains
(ES) have a small protective effect against attempts.
Considering now the conﬁgurations of three security devices, that is, triplets, in Figure 2,
it is clear that they generally confer double the protection provided by pairs. As perhaps
anticipated, the highest (roughly 34 and 14 SPFs for completed and attempted burglary,
respectively) is offered by external lights, window and door locks (EWD). Among the
remaining triplet combinations the addition to window and door locks of security chains
(WSD), CCTV (CWD) or indoor lights (IWD) confers roughly 32, 24 and 17 times higher
protection against competed burglary than no security. Their protection factor against attempts
is 8, non-signiﬁcant and 25, respectively. The magnitude of the protection against burglary
conferred by triples is considerably greater than that against attempts. For the three triplets
conferring greatest protection against burglary, they confer more than double the protection
against attempts. However, the combination of indoor lights, window and door locks (IWD) is
one out of two (the second such conﬁguration discussed in the next paragraph) that confers
more protection against attempts than burglary with entry. As will be seen next, EWD and
WSD confer more protection than most combinations of four or more devices.
Device quadruples and greater
Figure 3 presents the SPFs of combinations of four or more security devices with signiﬁcant
odds ratios. The SPFs with regard to burglary with entry are discussed in this and the next
two paragraphs. The most striking feature is the extraordinary SPF of 139 against burglary
for the combination of all seven security devices examined here except CCTV (EIWSBD).
These devices in combination were reported by 931 households (see Table 2) in the 2008/
2009–2011/2012 CSEW and the effect is statistically reliable albeit a clear outlier that has
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not been replicated in preliminary (not shown here) analyses of previous CSEW sweeps.
The respective bar has been truncated in Figure 3 to allow the effects of the remaining
conﬁgurations better to be appreciated. The second most surprising ﬁnding shown in
Figure 3 (and in comparison with Figure 2) is that burglary protection does not consistently
increase with the number of devices that make up each conﬁguration.
The second and third highest SPFs against burglary (after the above-mentioned outlier
effect) are, perhaps surprisingly, delivered by the combination of only four security devices
out of the seven examined. One of these high-impact four-way combinations includes
CCTV, window and door locks and security chains (CWSD). It confers 52 times more
protection against burglary compared with no security. The other refers to lights (external
and indoor) and locks (for windows and doors) (EIWD) that confers similar protection by a
factor of 49. Window and door locks, security chains and external lights (EWSD) confer
protection by a factor of 31.5, whereas the remaining four devices conﬁgurations, that is,
IWSD, WSBD, IWBD and EWBD, reduce burglary odds ratios by a factor of between 23
and 16.5 in the above order.
Looking at combinations of ﬁve devices the most effective protection against burglary is
conferred by external lights, window and door locks, burglar alarm and either CCTV
(CEWBD) or security chains (EWSBD) – by a factor of about 32. Similar protection is found
for the two quintuplets of locks and lights with either burglar alarm or security chains, that is,
EIWBD and EIWSD, with SPFs of about 30 and 28, while locks, security chains, burglar
alarm and indoor lights (IWSBD) reduce burglary with entry odds ratios to 1/23 of that of no
security. Finally, households reporting the combination of all devices except security chains
(CEIWBD) are protected against burglaries 34 times than those having no security.
Turning now our attention to attempts in Figure 3, the highest protection is conferred by
EIWSD which is the second burglary devices conﬁguration to affect attempts more than
burglary with entry. EIWD and EWSD are the third and fourth most protective conﬁguration
against attempts while the second and ﬁfth place are held by triplets: IWD, mentioned earlier
for its higher effectiveness against attempted than completed burglary, and EWD.
The more the merrier?
One question one may ask is whether the SPFs of burglary security combinations are a
straightforward extrapolation of the SPFs of the individual devices that make up each
conﬁguration. The answer is that they are not. For example, the impact of car security
conﬁgurations against theft of car is greater than the expected from the individual
contributions of the devices that make up each combination (Farrell et al, 2011). The
difference between expected and observed SPFs gives the net interaction effect (NIE) which
is calculated as follows: As seen earlier in Figure 1 the SPF for window locks, W, is 6.58
(albeit non-statistically signiﬁcant) and that for door locks, D, is 2.79. The sum of the two
individual impact factors is the expected protection from their combination, WD, and equals
9.37. In Figure 2 and the ﬁrst row in Table 3, however, the WD conﬁguration has an SPF of
12.54. This exceeds the expected impact by 3.17 which is the NIE of this particular
combination. The third and ﬁfth columns of Table 3 give the NIEs of security conﬁgurations
against burglary with entry and attempts, respectively. Non-surprisingly the greatest NIE
(120) refers to the combination of all security devices except CCTV (EIWSBD), which had
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extremely high impact against burglary with entry. The next four greatest NIEs for the same
crime type refer to the following conﬁgurations in descending order: CWSD (38.9), EIWD
(33.2), EWD (22) and WSD (20.9). The ﬁve conﬁgurations with greatest NIE with respect to
attempts are EIWSD (22), IWD (18.2), EIWD (13), CWSD (10.5) and EWSD (8.9).
Two points are worth mentioning here. First, the number of devices is not the main driver
in burglary prevention. It is rather the effectiveness of a particular combination. For instance,
the second best SPF and NIE against attempts is provided by the combination of only three
devices: IWD. Second, the magnitude of the NIE roughly reﬂects the SPF value for each
security conﬁguration but not always. For example, WSD has a higher NIE but lower SPF
against burglary with entry than, say, CEIWBD (15.6), EWSBD (17.1) or CEWBD (17.6).
Protection against burglary and attempts does not consistently increase with the number
of devices that make up each conﬁguration. This is evidenced in Table 4 that shows the
mean SPF protection across the different number of burglary devices per combination (in
descending order with respect to burglary with entry). Protection increases greatly from two
to three devices against both burglary and attempts. The mean level of protection conferred
against burglary by three devices is, however, almost as high as that of four or ﬁve devices.
Against burglary, the SPF means of four and ﬁve devices are almost identical. The protection
conferred against burglary is always greater than that against attempts, irrespective of the
number of devices, as shown in the ﬁnal column as the ratio of the SPF of burglary to that of
attempts. On average, protection conferred against burglary is three times that of attempts,
although this is skewed by the SPF of six devices against burglary (Table 4, last row). If six-
device combinations are excluded, the mean SPF conferred against burglary is double that
against attempts. Consequently, as might be expected, it is not simply a case of ‘the more the
merrier’, as the types of devices that are combined has an effect. More precisely gauging the
marginal effect of devices added to particular combinations may be an area for further
research.
Conclusions
This study was motivated by mounting evidence that security improvements have played a
signiﬁcant role in the unprecedented long-term decline in volume crime generally, and
Table 4: Mean security protection factor across security devices combinations
Number of
devices
Burglary with entry Attempted burglary Crime type ratio
of mean SPFs
Mean SPF Number of
combinations
Mean SPF Number of
combinations
6 86.43 2 11.16 1 7.74
4 29.84 7 12.87 6 2.32
5 29.25 5 17.31 3 1.69
3 26.82 4 15.51 3 1.73
2 11.91 4 4.18 4 2.85
1 2.05 6 1.22 6 1.68
Grand mean 31.05 10.38 3.00
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household burglary in particular, in many industrialised countries (Van Dijk et al, 2012).This
is, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst work to examine the protective effects of all individual
burglary security devices for which data are available in the CSEW and their possible
conﬁgurations. Previous research on burglary security examined wide groups or the presence
of a device while ignoring any complementary or combinatory effects produced by the
co-presence of one or more other device. This work complements the previous literature, by
distinguishing the individual protection effects across a large number of devices and their
combinations. In addition, the SIAT methodology offers a novel approach to examining the
speciﬁc effects of different combinations of security devices, both individually and in
combination. Longitudinal analysis using the SIAT methodology may be a possibility for
future research.
The key ﬁndings are the following:
● Individual and combined security devices prevent burglaries with entry more than attempts
except for the triplet combination of indoor lights, window and door locks (IWD) and the
addition to this of external lights and security chains (EIWSD), which has the converse
effect.
● Individual security devices confer up to three times greater protection against burglary
with entry than no security. However, a burglar alarm (B) or a dummy alarm for attempts
without the presence of any other device is counter-productive increasing the odds ratios of
burglary.
● Combinations of security devices in general afford up to roughly 50 times more protection
than no security. The protection conferred against burglary, however, does not consistently
increase with the number of devices that make up the conﬁgurations.
What advice should be given to householders themselves or to those, such as landlords or
crime reduction partnerships, attempting to reduce the burglary risks to vulnerable third
parties? From a strictly practical perspective, the research reported here suggests if only one
security device is installed then ﬁtting external lights on a sensor (E) seems to provide
greatest protection against any burglary. If a further device is included, adding window locks
to external lights (EW) is suggested in relation to burglary with entry. The Home Ofﬁce
deﬁned basic security, that is, window and door locks (WD), produces second best results
against burglary with entry but confers additional protection against attempted burglary.
Window and door locks together with external lights or security chains (EWD or WSD)
seem the ultimate choice for balancing out number of devices and protection effectiveness:
they confer more security than most combinations of four or more devices. Indeed these
combinations of just three out of the seven examined devices confer, respectively, the fourth
and eighth highest protection effect against burglary with entry among all 31 signiﬁcant
combinations (see Figures 2 and 3 and Table 3). If more devices can be afforded, however,
the highest total protection (ignoring the outlier effect of six devices mentioned in the
previous section) can be gained by CCTV, window and door locks and security chains
(CWSD) or lights and locks (EIWD) that is the cheapest and safer option given the high cost
of CCTV and potential ﬁre hazard posed by security chains. From a narrow viewpoint of
burglary security, households, landlords and crime and safety partnerships should not even
contemplate installing ﬁve devices since such conﬁgurations are less effective against
burglary with entry than the above triplets and quadruplets.7 Therefore there are economies of
scale in the number of security devices installed to prevent burglary with diminishing returns
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after two. The protective value added by a second or third device is up to six – or two-fold than
a single device or a pair, respectively. In some instances adding a fourth or ﬁfth device reduces
the overall effectiveness of the combination resulting thus in dis-economies of scale.
Forthcoming changes to security standards for housing should take this into account.
In terms of cost-effectiveness, further research into the cost of security relative to the cost
of burglary is required. A best guess, based simply on the number of devices and impact,
would be that there is preliminary prima facie evidence that window and door locks together
with external lights or security chains may be the most cost effective. However, additional
variables such as level of disposable income and the likely loss from a burglary is likely to
weigh in householder’s security decision making, and in that context the present analysis
should be viewed as preliminary. ‘One size ﬁts all’ security is less effective than bespoke
security that accounts for group composition and context (Pease and Gill, 2011). The present
analysis forms the ﬁrst part of a wider research project on ‘Which Burglary Security Devices
Work for Whom and in What Context?’ Future work will seek to qualify the ﬁndings
reported here for different types of houses, households and areas. Complementing such
secondary data analyses ﬁndings with burglars’ accounts on how the security combinations
examined here may discourage them from breaking in would fully answer any questions the
current ﬁndings created.
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Notes
1 High-level security is incorporated in Secured By Design (SBD) planning and building recommendations that are
effective in reducing burglary (for example, Armitage and Monchuk, 2011). Burglary security devices are only
one element of SBD, however. Athe current results may inform SBD it is not further discussed here.
2 With sincere apologies to readers if the abbreviated security combinations make the ‘Results’ discussion
somewhat cumbersome. If so please refer back to this list.
3 In the 2008/2008–2011/2012 BCS sweeps 4.8 per cent of burglaries with entry and 5.2 per cent of attempted
burglaries occurred to victims of at least three more serious crimes.
4 A small number of cases (which make up: 0.17 per cent of the total sample, 1.6 per cent of all burglary victims, 2.6
per cent of victims of burglary with entry or 4.4 per cent of victims of attempts in 2008/2009–2011/2012), where a
respondent experienced both an attempted burglary and burglary with entry (separate incidents not considered to
be part of a series) were found. For the purposes of this analysis, security device availability was measured at the
time of interview for non-victims and at the time of the ﬁrst incident for victims. It was therefore necessary to
establish when each incident happened in order to ascertain which victimisation happened ﬁrst – the ‘successful’
burglary or the attempt. Data regarding the month in which each incident happened was originally established for
nine cases from the 2011/2012 sweep. Of the nine, four respondents ﬁrst experienced an attempted victimisation
and two burglaries with entry. With regard to the remaining three cases, both incidents happened in the same
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month. Therefore, we were unable to ascertain which incident happened ﬁrst. As a result, and because they
constitute a small proportion of the total sample, cases where a respondent experienced both an attempt and a
burglary with entry are excluded from this analysis.
5 Note also that a ‘don’t know’ security category refers to respondents who answered so to all seven devices. To
preserve the number of valid observations if respondents answered ‘don’t know’ to having some devices and ‘yes/
no’ to others, the ‘yes/no’ responses have taken preference. Where a respondent answered ‘don’t know’ to some
of the devices and ‘no’ to all others this is coded as ‘no security’ together with ‘no’ responses to all seven devices.
6 The signiﬁcance is based on the P-values of the z-score for testing the hypothesis that the proportions of security
availability differs between burgled households and the entire ﬂeet under the assumption of identical, that is, no
security effect, but unknown population proportion.
7 Unless the aim is to reduce attempted burglaries at the expense of completed ones since the highest protection
against the former crime type is conferred by EIWSD.
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